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ABSTRACT 
The private transfers sent by immigrant workers back to their home countries, or remittances, can 
improve the development of recipient countries through poverty reduction, higher education, and 
new business formation. However, the effect of remittances on income inequality is still debatable. 
While some studies suggest that these transfers are sent to the poor, other investigations find that 
remittances are directed toward higher-income cohorts, widening the gap between rich and poor. 
This study provides new evidence about potential income inequality reduction driven by remittances 
and quality of institutions. For instance, weak institutions discourage the usage of remittances 
toward productive ventures, more so among poor families. Middle- and high-income groups tend 
to be better prepared to reduce their exposure to the damages of weak institutions. We constructed 
instrumental variables and completed two-stage least square (2SLS) analysis to address possible 
causality bias, a problem so pervasive in this type of empirical studies. Using a set of 25 institutional 
indicators, we find that remittance recipient countries with better institutions have more meaningful 
reduction in income inequality. This effect is stronger among heavy remittance-recipient countries. 
 
Keywords: Remittances, institutions, inequality, developing countries. 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
Remittances represent a vital source of income in developing countries. They are known to reduce 
credit constraints, and improve health, education, and housing among recipient families (Cox-
Edwards and Ureta 2003; Acosta 2006; Chaing et al. 2012). Figure 1 reports countries with the 
highest remittances-to-GDP ratio in 2016. Nepal was highest (31.2%), followed by the Kyrgyz 
Republic (30.4%) and Haiti (29.4%). From our group of developing countries, 35.9% show 
remittance-to-GDP ratios above 5%, and 54.2% received more than US$100 per person in 2016. 
This source of foreign income can lift entire nations out of extreme poverty, providing more than 
US$400 per capita in some recipient countries, such as Armenia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and 
Lebanon (Figure 2.) 
 
Although remittances can be a notable source of poverty reduction, their effect on income inequality 
is less evident. Studies using micro-data on migration and remittances have noted that sending 
family members abroad is expensive, thus, most migration and remittances occur among high-
income groups (Adams 1989; McKenzie and Rapoport 2007). However, migration and settlement 
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Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Figure 1: Top remittances receiving countries as a proportion of GDP (2016) 
 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculation using data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Figure 2: Top remittances receiving countries per capita (2016) 
 
expenses eventually decline once networks of immigrants from the same community assist others 
with job searching and boarding. Ultimately, even low-income families have access to remittances. 
Declines in income inequality become evident when examining the marginal productivity of 
remittances among groups. Poor families that use remittances to relax credit constraints and expand 
small businesses would extract higher productivity per dollar than rich families, which are 
experiencing lower marginal productivity rates.  
 
The complex relationship between remittances and income inequality is intensified when 
introducing the quality of institutions. If remittances can reduce inequality though their uses in 
business development and productive investment, this effectiveness could be hampered by poor 
resource allocation due to impaired institutional framework. 
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We conjecture that remittances reduce inequality and do so by a greater extent among countries that 
pursue institutional improvements. We use multiple econometric techniques to provide robustness 
to the results. As a first step, panel ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators confirm our hypothesis; 
however, there is evidence of possible endogeneity bias among this type of studies. Therefore, we 
construct instrumental variables (IVs) and run two-stage least square regressions (2SLS) to confirm 
the stability of the results. Our findings indicate that remittances, in the presence of a solid 
institutional framework, reduce inequality by a greater magnitude. Our results are consistent with 
previous empirical studies (Acosta et al., 2008; Koechlin and Leon, 2007; Portes, 2009). 
 
The contributions to the literature on income inequality are threefold. First, most studies on 
remittances and inequality have focused on country-case studies and survey data, diminishing the 
applicability of policy recommendations to other countries or regions. This study includes 79 
developing countries and 25 institutional indicators, providing a more general framework to the 
analysis. Second, previous studies have focused on a two-dimensional path: remittances and 
inequality or institutions and inequality, whereas this study analyses the three areas: remittances, 
institutions and inequality. Third, instead of arbitrarily choosing a narrow set of institutional quality 
indicators that may produce selection biases, we provide a comprehensive empirical analysis on 25 
institutional indicators and their effect on inequality rates.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a definition of the 
institutional quality and theoretical background on inequality, remittances, and institutions. In 
addition, this section includes the most recent literature review on two areas of interest: remittances 
and inequality, and the complementarity between remittances, institutions, and income inequality. 
Section 3 develops the empirical methodology, including the regression methods and data 
description. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, Section 5 offers the concluding remarks and 
policy implications for developing countries that receive remittances. 
 
2   LITERATURE REVIEW: Institutions, Remittances, and Inequality 
 
2.1 Institutional Quality Indicators 
 
The quality of institutions matters in the economic development of a nation (Keefer and Knack 
1995; Mauro 1995). However, it is an ongoing challenge to empirically assess the quality of 
institutions and to be able to compare institutional indicators among several developing countries. 
To address this point, we define institutions as the formal rules and organizations governing the 
political, economic, and social behavior of individuals within the political borders of an economy. 
In measuring the quality of institutions, we make use of 25 Institutional Quality Indicators (IQI) 
over a 20-year period in 79 developing countries. Each of these IQI measures has been used 
extensively in the empirical literature on growth and development (Heckelman and Stroup 2000; 
Bekaert et al. 2006; Borja 2014).1  
                                                             
1 Borja (2014), for example, estimates the interactive and marginal effects of remittances and institutions on long-
term growth using 28 institutional indicators for a large set of developing countries. She finds that countries with 
more developed social capital frameworks can leverage remittances toward economic growth more effectively than 
those with weaker social capital infrastructure. We adopt a similar set of metrics assessing institutional quality but 
expand the analysis by examining issues of income inequality. 
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Using institutional indexes to explain income inequality has some limitations. First, these indexes 
are, at the most, a gross approximation of the actual quality of institutions since the construction 
of many IQIs come from survey information on perceptions and opinions rather than actual data. 
Second, studies empirically addressing the effect of institutions on income inequality have used a 
single indicator or a narrow set of indicators to account for institutional quality; which introduces 
a degree of arbitrariness to the analysis. By applying 25 IQI to our study, we attempt to address 
potential biases arising from these limitations.  
 
We divide the IQIs into three areas: policy enforcement (PE), which includes indicators of 
corruption, property rights, and regulatory quality; political stability (PS), which concerns 
government stability, and internal and international conflict; and economic policy (EP), which is 
comprised of inflation, economic openness, and level of government expenditure. For instance, we 
use eight political/institutional indexes developed by the Political Risk Service Group in their 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) report. The ICRG indexes have been used amply in 
previous studies as proxies for political risk and institutional quality and comprise data on more 
than 140 countries (Keefer and Knack 1995, 2002; Calderon and Chong 2000; Evans and Rauch 
2000; Mendez and Sepulveda 2006). 
 
Table 1 provides the list and sources of all indicators included in each area. It also includes the 
correlation parameter between inequality—measured by the Gini coefficient—and each of the 
IQIs. Note that higher PE and PS values reflect higher institutional quality. Appendix 1 provides 
detailed information regarding the construction, source and coverage for each IQI. 
 
Table 1:  Institutional quality indicators - correlations with the Gini coefficient 
Category  Institutional Quality Indicator Correlation Obs 
  Remittances -0.110* 315 
Policy 
Enforcement  
(PE) Indicators 
1 ICRG-Corruption 0.170** 209 
2 ICRG-Law and Order -0.182*** 209 
3 ICRG-Bureaucracy 0.096 209 
4 ICRG-Quality Institutions 0.018 209 
5 WGI-Regulatory Quality 0.312*** 186 
6 WGI-Rule of Law -0.012 186 
7 WGI-Corruption 0.188*** 186 
8 HF-Economic Freedom Index 0.399*** 189 
9 HF-Property Rights 0.187*** 189 
10 HF-Freedom from Corruption 0.238*** 189 
11 FI-Legal Structure/Property 
Rights 
-0.011 215 
12 TI-Corruption Perception Index 0.229*** 130 
Political 
Stability (PS) 
Indicators 
13 ICRG-Government Stability -0.117* 209 
14 ICRG-Internal Conflict 0.073 209 
15 ICRG-External Conflict 0.158** 209 
16 ICRG-Ethnic Tensions 0.226*** 209 
17 Polity IV 0.418*** 225 
18 WGI-Voice and Accountability 0.378*** 186 
19 WGI-Absence of Violence 0.255*** 186 
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20 WGI-Government Effectiveness 0.150** 186 
Economic 
Policy (EP) 
Indicators 
21 WBDI-Government 
Consumption 
0.368*** 232 
22 WDI-Money Growth (M2) 0.089 232 
23 FI-Black Market Exchange Rate 0.222*** 219 
24 FI-Tariff 0.467*** 218 
25 WBDI-Openness 0.128* 231 
Notes: A detailed explanation of each index is presented in the Appendix 1. WBDI: World Bank Development Indicator; 
ICRG: International Country Risk Guide (The Political Risk Service Group); WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators; 
HF: The Heritage Foundation; FI: Fraser Institute; TI-Corruption Perception Index: Transparency International. 
The values refer to pairwise correlations between each institutional quality indicator and the Gini coefficient as well 
as the number of observations. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
The Gini coefficient is in natural logs. 
 
2.2 Inequality and Remittances: The Theory 
 
Leading research in the area of migration, remittances, and inequality provides the theoretical 
framework for our empirical analysis. In a model developed by Docquier and Rapoport (2003), 
and further developed by Shen et al. (2010), an economy has two types of households with multiple 
income sources. The households differentiate themselves by type of productivity (e.g., high and 
low productivity), which in turn depends on the quantity and quality of inherited assets (e.g., land 
and machinery). That is, low-productivity households show greater liquidity and asset constraints. 
Each household maximizes utility subject to a budget that is relaxed in the presence of remittances. 
 
An expanded budget increases wealth for both types of households, but those with lower initial 
asset endowment and higher marginal productivity of capital evolve to a higher steady state, 
reducing the income gap between household types. That is, remittances allow access to productive 
assets and inputs, moving households to the high-productivity type with income-equalizing effects. 
Thus, in the long run, the Shen et al. (2010) model predicts that remittances reduce inequality. In 
the short term, however, remittances might increase or decrease the income gap. For instance, 
households with higher asset endowments are better equipped to send family members abroad, 
which is an expensive endeavor during the initial periods of migration (Adams 1989). Empirically, 
some studies have confirmed that higher inequality is only a temporary stage since eventually, 
migration costs can be reduced owing to social networking and assistance from well-established 
communities in the host country, making migration more affordable for low-income families 
(Borja 2013; Taylor et al. 2003; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). 
 
In summary, the theory on remittances and inequality provides an inverted U-shaped pattern, in 
which remittances initially increase the income gap between households, but eventually reduce 
inequality (Stark et al. 1986). Empirically, however, the relationship between remittances and 
inequality is more elusive. 
 
2.3 Inequality, institutions, and Remittances: The Empirics 
Remittances are a central pillar in the economic sustainability of many developing nations. At the 
country level, these transfers reduce balance of payment deficits, expand economic growth, and 
are much more stable source of income than foreign direct investment (World Bank 2006; Borja 
2012a). At the household level, remittances reduce poverty and improve the level of health, 
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education, and consumption of recipient families (Frank and Hummer 2002; Cox-Edwards and 
Ureta 2003; Adams and Page 2005; Giannetti et al. 2009).  
 
However, these foreign inflows may lead to perverse effects on income inequality in the short term. 
Country surveys indicate that only better-off families are able to raise the funds necessary to pay 
the strenuous travel expenses to send family members abroad, increasing intra-community 
inequality (Stark et al. 1986; Adams 1989). In addition, remittance recipient families have the 
opportunity to access private healthcare, to keep children in school for longer periods of time, and 
to acquire investment and productive assets (Acosta 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; 
Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). If these resources are received mostly by middle to upper-income 
households, remittances may lead to an increase in income inequality.  
 
Stark et al. (1986) and (1988) compare the direct effect of remittances on income inequality for 
two Mexican villages with different remittances-to-total income ratios. The Gini coefficient is 
disaggregated using non-remittance income and total income (including remittances). In both 
villages, inequality is reduced, and more so in the village with higher remittance-to-income ratio. 
However, remittances were unevenly distributed among income groups in the village with lower 
migration ratio, with high income families taking up most of the remittance proceeds.  
 
Taylor (1992) also explores the relationship between remittances and the Gini coefficient –as a 
measure of income inequality– by collecting information on farmers in Mexico. Groups of families 
were interviewed in 1983 and 1989, allowing for matched longitudinal data. His finding indicates 
that remittances increase income inequality among rural households. This effect is stronger in 
earlier years, but fades away in more recent years, providing empirical evidence of an inverted U-
shaped relationship mentioned above.  
 
Taylor and Wyatt (1996) test the direct and the shadow effect of remittances on income inequality. 
Using the same data from Taylor (1992), they found that remittances have a positive effect on 
income, but this effect is larger among poor households with illiquid assets and credit constraints, 
reducing the income gap between poor and rich families.  
 
Using income and other demographics from three villages in Egypt, Adams (1989) developed a 
predictive model of family income distribution that includes remittances. He found that the 
predicted mean income in the bottom group increased by merely 0.18 percent when adding 
remittances, while the predicted mean income for the top quintile increased by 10.1 percent, 
widening the income gap among groups. Following the same approach, Barham and Boucher 
(1998) found that remittances increase the gap among income groups for the case of three 
communities in Nicaragua. 
 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) also argue that migration is expensive. Families must incur the 
direct costs of settlement and job searching in the host countries. Thus, in the first stages of 
migration, only wealthier families have the means to send members abroad and be rewarded with 
remittances. As more migration occurs and new networks of migrants are developed, the costs of 
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migration can be reduced, and lower-income families can also enjoy remittance inflows.2 Using 
data on 57 communities from 13 Mexican states, these authors corroborate that initial migration is 
observed among middle to upper income groups; which would eventually become the recipients 
of remittances. Their main conclusion is that the effect of remittances on income inequality is 
subjected to the migration history of the community.  
 
Acosta et al. (2008) provide an extensive comparative study on remittances and inequality using 
both macro data (balance of payments statistics) and micro data (national surveys) for Latin 
America. This detailed investigation of 10 nations is unable to provide clear demographic patterns 
among remittance recipient households. For example, under the micro-data scope, some migrants 
come from lower-income brackets (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico), while others come from 
the highest-income cohorts (Haiti, Nicaragua, and Peru). From the econometric analysis using 
macro-data (59 developed and developing countries), they found that remittances tend to increase 
inequality, although the magnitude is relatively small. Once the Latin America region is controlled 
for, the estimator changes sign, suggesting that remittances actually reduce inequality for the 
region. The authors attribute the positive impact of remittances on inequality to lower migration 
costs in Latin America, mostly due to the short distance to the largest host country (the U.S.), and 
well-developed migrant networks of Hispanic communities in the U.S.  
 
Using a large set of countries, Portes (2009) concludes that remittances have a greater equalizing 
effect in low income countries compared to the entire sample. When focusing on specific income 
groups – deciles – remittances increase the income of those in the lowest decile group, and this 
effect declines for higher income deciles.   
 
In summary, the literature on the effects of remittances on income inequality is inconclusive, 
particularly in the short-term framework. However, in the long run, once the migration 
communities help new immigrants to settle, remittances are more evenly distributed among all 
groups, providing an effective source of reducing income inequality. 
 
In the case of institutions, Koechlin and Leon (2007) estimated the effects of remittances on 
income inequality –measured by the Gini coefficient– when quality of institutions is incorporated 
in the analysis. Education, democratic progress, and financial development are used as a way to 
assess the role of institutions. Koechlin and Leon’s (2007) findings show that institutions “can help 
countries to reach more quickly the point at which international remittances begin to reduce 
inequality.” (pp. 127). Specifically, they find remittances to have an equalizing effect in countries 
with a remittances-to-GDP ratio greater than 1.4 percent.  
 
Calderon and Chong (2000) compile a set of institutional indexes from the ICRG and the Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) for about 80 countries to determine the link between 
institutions and inequality over the period 1970-1995. The authors find a nonlinear relationship 
between institutions and inequality in which each index exhibits a positive coefficient while its 
squared value shows a consistent negative coefficient over different cross-sectional models. The 
reasoning is that in the first stages of development, institutional quality does not matter much in 
                                                             
2 Massey and Espinosa (1997), Munshi (2003), and Borja (2013) provide evidence for the costs associated with 
migration as well as the benefits from well-developed social networks and organizations of immigrants in the host 
countries. 
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reducing inequality. Later, Calderon et al. (2009) find poor evidence that the quality of institutions 
plays a role in the effectiveness of foreign aid on income inequality. 
 
As Table 1 shows, there is a significant and negative correlation between remittances and 
inequality (corr = -0.110). However, the correlations between income inequality and institutional 
indexes exhibit a wide range. While the ICRG-Law and Order shows a negative correlation with 
the Gini coefficient (corr = -0.182), the ICRG-Ethnic Tensions and WGI-Absence of Violence 
display positive values (corr = 0.226 and corr = 0.255, respectively), supporting the diverse 
relationships between quality of institutions and income inequality as observed in Calderon and 
Chong (2000). 
 
3   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We construct an unbalanced dataset of 79 developing countries over a 20-year period from 1990 to 
2010, broken into 4-year non-overlapping periods.3 Appendix 2 provides the list of countries used 
in this study. 
 
We proceed by testing the effect of remittances on income inequality, controlling for education and 
economic development without the institutional quality indicators. Subsequently, we determine if 
the remittance parameter increases once controlling for the institutional quality indicators in a series 
of regressions, using a single IQIs in each regression. For instance, we test whether a less corrupt 
society could leverage remittances toward an improved distribution of income. In this case, 
remittances would lift the income of the poor in a more significant way than it would those at the 
top of the income hierarchy.4 The baseline econometric model for our unbalanced panel dataset is 
presented in Equation (1). 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖$,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐$,& + 𝛽0𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐$,&0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝑈$,& + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑀$,& + 𝛾$ + 𝜀$,&       (1) 
 
where	𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖$,& is the natural log Gini coefficient for country i at time period t; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐$,& is the natural 
log of the real GDP per capita; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐$,&0  represents the squared value of the natural log of the real 
GDP per capita; 𝐸𝐷𝑈$,& is the natural log of education, defined as the percentage of population who 
completed secondary school; and 𝑅𝐸𝑀$,&  is the natural log of remittances in current US$. The 
parameter 𝛾$ is the unobserved between country effect, and ε is the error term. 
 
Equation (1) measures the effect of remittances on the Gini coefficient, after controlling for 
education, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and its squared value. These control variables 
are consistent with the broader literature on income inequality (Milanovic 1994; Deininger and 
                                                             
3 Limitations in data availability defined our period of study. With 4-year periods, each country has six observations 
starting 1990. See Leon-Gonzalez & Montolio (2015), Borja (2014), Leon-Gonzalez and Vinayagathasan (2013) and 
Chen et al. (2011) regarding the use of 4-year non-overlapping time intervals. 
4 Multicollinearity is a concern in empirical specifications with multiple indexes, thus, instead of completing a single 
regression with all 25 IQIs, we construct 25 regressions. An alternative approach is to combine a set of IQIs into a 
single “pooled” index ; however, this would require subjective calls on which of the 25 indicators are pooled 
together and the weight of each IQI in the new pooled index. Although, we completed this exercise, these 
regressions may suffer from serious endogeneity bias. In addition, we run three series or regressions: (1) a regression 
with all PE-IQI, (2) a regression with the PS-IQI, and (3) a regression with the EP-IQI. The remittance parameter is 
consistently negative in all cases.  
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Squire 1997; Li et al. 1998; Calderon and Chong 2000). The squared GDP value controls for the 
inverted U-shaped dynamic of inequality during the course of development as described in Kuznets 
(1955) and Barro (2000). The inclusion of an education variable accounts for the significant 
negative relationship between human capital investment and inequality observed in DeGregorio 
and Lee (2002). Sources of the data are presented in Appendix 1. 
An empirical challenge in equation (1) is the presence of possible endogeneity between inequality 
and remittances. It is costly to send a family member abroad, and thus, it is possible that remittances 
will be captured only among high-income households. This suggests that remittances are 
endogenous and partially determined by the pre-existing distribution of family income levels. To 
address endogeneity, we use instrumental variables (IV) and run two-stage regression estimates. 
An effective IV should have a causality effect with the endogenous variable (remittances), but 
limited direct effect over the dependent variable (the Gini coefficient). One approach in the 
construction of a suitable IV is to use information on the U.S. GDP. Borja (2012b), Borja (2013) 
and Ziesemer (2006) demonstrated that the GDP and unemployment rate of the U.S. are likely to 
affect the volume of remittances that immigrant workers can send to their home countries. Since 
the U.S. represents the largest remittance-source country, it is anticipated that this economy affects 
the remittance flows of many developing countries in our sample. At the same time, it is expected 
that the U.S. GDP will have limited effects on the income inequality of remittance-recipient 
countries. Following Borja (2014)’s method, we construct an IV as shown in Equation (2). 
 𝐼𝑉1$,& = 	 =>?@,ABCDEF,A        (2) 
 
where REMi,t  is the log value of remittances for country i, and GDPUS,t  denotes the log value of US 
GDP at time t. IV1 is the ratio of remittances of country i as a share of US GDP. This type of IV 
has also been used in the literature by Aggarwal et al. (2006) and Chami et al. (2008). 
 
Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) use a gravity model to further explain bilateral remittance flows. 
They conclude that more than 50% of remittance flows can be accounted for by the immigrant-host 
country’s GDP values and the distance between host country and remittance-recipient country. 
Based on this finding, we develop a second IV that incorporates the business cycle of the largest 
remittance-sending countries weighted by the proximity between the remittance sending and 
recipient countries from our sample.  
 
This second instrumental variable (IV2) is similar to IV1, but instead of using the U.S. as the only 
remittance-source country, IV2 incorporates the GDP of the 14 largest remittance-source countries. 
The business cycle in the U.S. may be more relevant to Central American and South American 
countries, but less so for countries further away from the U.S. The second IV aims to control for 
this geographic difference by placing greater weight to the largest remittance-sending countries in 
close proximity to the recipient country. To avoid arbitrariness in the influence that these 14 
countries’ business cycle exerts over the remittances of recipient countries, we weight each source 
country according to the distance to the recipient country. Thus, the GDP of a source country that 
is close to a recipient country will have more relevance in explaining remittances. The weights sum 
to unity. The reasoning stems from the gravity model literature, in which bilateral flows of trade (in 
our case, remittances) become larger the closer the geographical proximity among countries. The 
implication is that remittances received by the developing country are more dependent on the 
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business cycle of a country closer in distance. The approach is similar to that used in Acosta et al. 
(2008) in which the author constructs an instrumental variable based on the distance to the top ten 
migrant receiving countries. Equation (3) now describes our second IV: 
 𝐼𝑉2$,& = 	 =>?@,A∑ IJ∗BCDJ,ALMJNL        (3) 
 
where k =14 represents the top 14 remittance-sending countries5;	𝑊P  is the weight given to country 
k determined by the distance between country i and country k; and i is equal to the 79 recipient 
remittance countries from our sample; t denotes the time period; and 𝐺𝐷𝑃P,& is the real GDP of 
country k at time t6. 
Subsequently, each institutional indicator is incorporated in the regression to test whether 
remittances have a larger impact on reducing inequality. The empirical specification is similar to 
Equation (1) and is presented in Equation (4). 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖$,& = 𝛽) + 𝛽+𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐$,& + 𝛽0𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐$,&0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝑈$,& + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑀$,& + 𝛽Q𝐼𝑄𝐼S,$,& + 𝛾$ + 𝜀$,&   (4) 𝑓𝑜𝑟		𝑗 = 1, … , 25 
 
where 𝐼𝑄𝐼S,$,& is the Institutional Quality Indicator j for recipient country i at time t. The remaining 
variables are consistent with those used in Equation (1). 
 
4 RESULTS: Remittances Reduce Income Inequality 
 
4.1 All 79 developing countries 
 
Table 2 displays the results from Equation (1). The remittance parameters show a steady negative 
value among the three models, supporting our initial hypothesis that remittances reduce inequality. 
The Kuznets hypothesis in which the squared GDP value controls for the inverted U-shaped 
dynamic of inequality during the course of development is corroborated by the positive values of 
the GDP per capita and the negative values of the squared GDP per capita (all three models in 
Table 2). As expected, education decreases inequality, but this parameter is statistically 
insignificant in all models. 
 
Our baseline results show an equalizing effect of remittances after controlling for the Kuznets 
hypothesis and education. Portes (2009) also uses a panel dataset of developing countries to 
estimate that a one percent increase in remittances increases the income of the bottom decile by 
0.43 percent and decreases the income of the top decile by 0.10 percent resulting in a reduction in 
                                                             
5 The top remittance-sending countries that sent in excess of US$5 billion dollars of remittances in 2009 are: United States, Saudi 
Arabia, Switzerland, Russia, Germany, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Netherlands, Malaysia, Lebanon, Oman and France 
(World Bank, 2012).  
6The weights used in IV2 are based on the distance from a remittance-recipient country i to the fourteen highest remittance-
sending countries k.  Specifically, the weight given to country k is calculated based on the distance from country i to country k 
divided by the sum of distances from country i to all fourteen k countries. The inverse of this ratio, which is larger as the i 
country is closer to k country, is used to allocate more weight towards those k countries geographically closer to i country, as 
remitters tend to be concentrated on these countries. The sum of the weights equals one. 
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Table 2: Remittances and income inequality under OLS and 2SLS 
Variable Panel OLS 
(1) 
2SLS-IV1 
(2) 
2SLS-IV2 
(3) 
REM -0.025** 
(-2.39) 
-0.023** 
(-2.20) 
-0.032*** 
(-2.93) 
GDPpc 0.915*** 
(3.22) 
0.914*** 
(3.21) 
0.920*** 
(3.22) 
GDPpc2 -0.055*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.055*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.056*** 
(-2.98) 
EDU -0.083 
(-1.46) 
-0.086 
(-1.51) 
-0.071 
(-1.24) 
Constant 0.924 
(0.92) 
0.901 
(0.90) 
1.007 
(1.00) 
Wald stat- χ2 
(p-value) 
 25.44*** 
(0.000) 
29.07*** 
(0.000) 
Cragg-Donald stat-F 
(p-value) 
 977.74*** 
(0.000) 
312.35*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman stat- χ2 (p-
value) 
 1.65  
(0.799) 
6.23 
(0.183) 
Observations 198 198 198 
R-Squared 0.302 0.301 0.297 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent 
variable is the Gini Coefficient.  All variables are in logs and t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. The Hausman 
test compares the estimators from the OLS model and the 2SLS models where the null hypothesis is that the estimators 
from the 2SLS are efficient and consistent as those from the OLS estimators. The Wald test confirms the IVs are 
exogenous and the Cragg-Donald statistic tests the strength of the IVs. 
 
income inequality.  Our baseline results are consistent with this finding, though somewhat more 
modest when using the Gini coefficient as opposed to income deciles to measure inequality.  
Specifically, we estimate a one percent increase in remittances reduces the Gini coefficient 
between 0.025 and 0.083 percent for all developing countries depending on the institutional quality 
measure and instrumental variable. Acosta et al. (2008) find a similar result for ten Latin American 
countries concluding that a one percent increase in the share of remittances to GDP will reduce 
inequality between 0.06 and 0.12 percent for the typical country in that region. 
 
Remittances reduce inequality; but do they reduce inequality more effectively once controlling for 
the institutional environment in the recipient nation? Table 3 presents a set of regressions that 
include a PE indicator (WGI – Rule of Law), a PS indicator (WGI – Absence of Violence), and an 
EP indicator (FI – Black Market Exchange Rate) under panel OLS, 2SLS-IV1, and 2SLS-IV2. 
 
Comparing Tables (2) and (3), we observe that the inclusion of the institutional quality indicator 
increases the marginal effect of remittances on inequality. For example, when controlling for the 
PE indicator, WGI - Rule of Law, the marginal impact of remittances increases from −0.025 (Table 
2) to −0.035 (Table 3). Similar results of a statistically significant increase in the marginal effect 
of remittances are displayed with the PS and EP indicators (WGI – Absence of Violence and FI – 
Black Market Exchange Rate, respectively). This result is consistent in magnitude with Koechlin 
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and Leon (2007), also finding an inequality reducing effect of remittances after controlling for 
financial stability in countries with a sufficiently high remittance-to-GDP ratio. 
 
Table 3: Remittances, institutions, and income inequality 
Variable Pane 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
IV1 
(2) 
2SLS 
IV2 
(3) 
Panel 
OLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
IV1 
(5) 
2SLS 
IV2 
(6) 
Panel 
OLS 
(7) 
2SLS 
IV1 
(8) 
2SLS 
IV2 
(9) 
REM -
0.035*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.033*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.043*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.029** 
(-2.33) 
-0.027** 
(-2.10) 
-0.040*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.027*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.025** 
(-2.45) 
-0.034*** 
(-3.24) 
GDPpc 0.674** 
(2.17) 
0.675** 
(2.18) 
0.670** 
(2.15) 
0.783** 
(2.65) 
0.781*** 
(2.64) 
0.792*** 
(2.66) 
0.867*** 
(3.16) 
0.868*** 
(3.16) 
0.865*** 
(3.14) 
GDPpc2 -0.040* 
(-1.93) 
-0.040* 
(-1.93) 
-0.040* 
(-1.92) 
-0.048** 
(-2.46) 
-0.048** 
(-2.45) 
-0.049** 
(-2.49) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.95) 
EDU -0.029 
(-0.48) 
-0.033 
(-0.54) 
-0.012 
(-0.20) 
-0.049 
(-0.83) 
-0.054 
(-0.91) 
-0.030 
(-0.50 
-0.057 
(-1.04) 
-0.061 
(-1.12) 
-0.044 
(-0.80) 
WGI-Rule 
of Law  
-0.052 
(-1.15) 
-0.051 
(-1.12) 
-0.056 
(-1.24) 
      
WGI-Abs. 
Violence 
   0.024 
(0.71) 
0.027 
(0.79) 
0.011 
(0.32) 
   
FI-Black 
Market 
      0.028** 
(2.54) 
0.028** 
(2.54) 
0.028** 
(2.54) 
Constant 1.805* 
(1.68) 
1.774* 
(1.65) 
1.930* 
(1.79) 
1.450 
(1.39) 
1.423 
(1.37) 
1.570 
(1.50) 
0.843 
(0.86) 
1.684 
(1.51) 
0.949 
(0.96) 
Wald stat 
(p) 
 24.58 
(0.000) 
29.48 
(0.000) 
 23.64 
(0.000) 
28.26 
(0.000) 
 32.45 
(0.000) 
36.76 
(0.000) 
Cragg-
Donald (p) 
 
 
719.51 
(0.000) 
230.27 
(0.000) 
 722.36 
(0.000) 
203.94 
(0.000) 
 795.65 
(0.000) 
232.18 
(0.000) 
Hausman 
χ2 (p) 
 1.50 
(0.913) 
6.81 
(0.236) 
 1.62 
(0.899) 
7.51 
(0.186) 
 2.78 
(0.734) 
6.61 
(0.251) 
Obs. 162 162 162 162 162 162 185 185 185 
R2 0.305 0.311 0.306 0.302 0.282 0.293 0.380 0.379 0.375 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent 
variable is the Gini Coefficient.  All variables are in logs and t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. The Hausman 
test compares the estimators from the OLS model and the 2SLS models where the null hypothesis is that the estimators 
from the 2SLS are efficient and consistent as those from the OLS estimators. The Wald test confirms the IVs are 
exogenous and the Cragg-Donald statistic tests the strength of the IVs. The (p) means p-values. 
 
Table 4 extends Table 3 by presenting the remittance parameter value when including each of the 
12 IQI-PE indexes. Table 4 shows only the parameter value of remittances and its significance. 
The parameter values for GDP per capita, its square value, education and each of the 12 IQIs are 
suppressed for clarity purposes.7 
 
Remittances significantly reduce income inequality when controlling for the Policy Enforcement 
(PE) indicators (Tables 4). For instance, once including TI-Corruption Perception Index in 
equation (4), the marginal effect of remittances increases from −0.025 to −0.042 under panel OLS 
(Table 4, Column 1, Rows 1 and 12); from −0.023 to −0.039 under IV1 (Table 4, Column 2, Rows 
 
 
                                                             
7 The econometric results and parameter values of EDU, GDP, and GDPsq from Tables 4–6 remain fairly stable 
over all regressions and can be provided by the authors upon request. 
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Table 4: Remittances, income inequality, and policy enforcement (PE) 
 IQI-PE Panel 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS-IV1 
(2) 
2SLS-IV2 
(3) 
 REM -0.025** -0.023** -0.032*** 
1 REM / ICRG-Corruption -0.024** -0.023** -0.032*** 
2 REM / ICRG-Law and Order -0.027** -0.025** -0.033*** 
3 REM / ICRG-Bureaucracy -0.026** -0.025** -0.034*** 
4 REM / ICRG-Quality Institutions -0.026** -0.024** -0.032*** 
5 REM / WGI-Regulatory Quality -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.039*** 
6 REM / WGI-Rule of Law -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.043*** 
7 REM / WGI-Corruption -0.032*** -0.030** -0.042*** 
8 REM / HF-Economic Freedom Index -0.028*** -0.026** -0.034*** 
9 REM / HF-Property Rights -0.026** -0.024** -0.034*** 
10 REM / HF-Freedom from Corruption -0.027** -0.025** -0.034*** 
11 REM / FI-Legal Structure /Property Rights -0.028** -0.027** -0.035*** 
12 REM / TI-Corruption Perception Index -0.042*** -0.039** -0.049*** 
 Significant Increase in the Magnitude of 
Remittances 11/12 11/12 12/12 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent variable is 
the Gini Coefficient.  All independent variables are in logs. The t-statistics are suppressed for clarity but the asterisks 
correspond to the level of significance.  The last row reflects the number of cases in which the IQI significantly 
increase the marginal effect of remittances when compared to values in row one. 
 
1 and 12); and from −0.032 to −0.049 under IV2 (Table 4, Column 3, Rows 1 and 12). Similarly, 
when controlling for the WGI-Regulatory Quality Index, the remittance parameter increases from 
−0.025 to −0.030 under panel OLS (Table 4, Column 1, Rows 1 and 5), from −0.023 to −0.028 
under IV1 (Table 4, Column 2, Rows 1 and 5), and from −0.032 to −0.039 under IV2 (Table 4, 
Column 3, Rows 1 and 5). Weak PE indicators, such as corruption, increase the costs of doing 
business and discourage the usage of remittances for productive ventures (Borja, 2017). These are 
features frequently observed among poor families who are unable to protect their assets against 
corrupt practices such as bribery and cumbersome steps to open new businesses. Middle- and high-
income groups are also exposed to corruption, but they tend to be better-connected with 
government officials and are more knowledgeable of the operations within the corrupt system, 
thus, reducing their exposure to the damages of corruption (Gupta et al. 2002).  
 
The last row in Table 4 captures how often the magnitude of the remittances parameter 
significantly increases with the inclusion of an IQI-PE. For example, the PE indicators increase 
the effect of remittances on inequality in 11 out of the 12 cases when using panel OLS or IV1, and 
in each of the 12 cases when using panel IV2. In summary, controlling for the PE index results in 
remittances having a stronger income equalizing effect. 
 
A similar trend is observed in Table 5. The Political Stability indicators (PS) significantly 
strengthen the marginal effect of remittances in reducing inequality in half of the indicators under 
Panel OLS, and under five indicators under IV1 or IV2 (last row of Table 5). For example, after 
controlling for the WGI – Absence of Violence, the marginal effect of remittances increases from 
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-0.025 to -0.029 under Panel OLS, from -0.023 to -0.027 under IV1, and from -0.032 to −0.040 
under IV2 (Tables 5, row 7). Studies have shown that crime, violence, and insecurity have a 
negative effect on remittances inflows, investment, and economic growth (Borja 2014; Goulas and 
Zervoyianni 2013); however, this effect is not evenly distributed among all groups. Poor 
populations are highly exposed to insecurity and violent crimes, more so than middle- and high-
income groups, who are able to move their residences and businesses out of the violent areas. 
These groups are also protected by more public security than poor communities (Fajnzylber et al. 
2002). Thus, low PS indicators will reduce the effective use of remittances, and this effect is 
stronger among low-income groups. 
 
The remittance parameters are statistically significant in all Economic Policy (EP) indicators 
presented in Table 6. The results show that EP strengthen the equalizing effect of remittances in 
40% of the cases (last row, Table 6). For instance, in countries with high level of inflation or 
cumbersome money exchange systems, poor families are exposed to the losses of value on their 
monetary assets –including remittances–, more so than middle- and high-income families 
(Ghossoub and Reed, 2017). Poor families tend to have limited venues to locate savings, and thus, 
high inflation can easily erode the value of their remittances. On the other hand, middle- and high-
income families have alternative outlets available to them to protect their assets against inflation 
(gold, foreign accounts, etc.) This implies that the burden of inflation weights more on low-income 
families and their productive assets, increasing the inequality gap. 
 
Table 5: Remittances, income inequality, and political stability (PS) 
 Institutional Quality Indicator Panel 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS-IV1 
(2) 
2SLS-IV2 
(3) 
 REM -0.025** -0.023** -0.032*** 
1 REM / ICRG-Government Stability -0.027** -0.022** -0.031*** 
2 REM / ICRG-Internal Conflict -0.024** -0.065*** -0.083*** 
3 REM / ICRG-External Conflict -0.023** -0.021* -0.030** 
4 REM / ICRG-Ethnic Tensions -0.025** -0.023** -0.032*** 
5 REM / Polity IV -0.025** -0.023** -0.028*** 
6 REM / WGI-Voice and Accountability -0.026** -0.024** -0.082*** 
7 REM /WGI-Absence of Violence -0.029** -0.027** -0.040*** 
8 REM / WGI-Government Effectiveness -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.042*** 
 Significant Increase in the Magnitude of 
Remittances 4/8 5/8 5/8 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent variable is 
the Gini Coefficient.  All independent variables are in logs. The t-statistics are suppressed for clarity but the asterisks 
correspond to the level of significance.  The last row reflects the number of cases in which the IQI significantly 
increase the marginal effect of remittances when compared to values in row one. 
 
Several important results emerge from Tables 4–6. First, after controlling for institutional quality 
indicators, remittances continue to reduce income inequality in each of the cases. Second, the IQIs 
show enhancing properties on the relationship between remittances and inequality; that is, 
remittances are more likely to have an income-equalizing effect among countries with higher 
institutional quality in place. 
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Table 6: Remittances, income inequality, and economic policy (EP) 
 Institutional Quality Indicator Panel 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS-IV1 
(2) 
2SLS-IV2 
(3) 
 REM -0.025** -0.023** -0.032*** 
1 REM / WBDI-Government Consumption -0.023** -0.022** -0.031*** 
2 REM / WDI-Money Growth (M2) -0.026** -0.024** -0.033*** 
3 REM / FI-Black Market Exchange Rate -0.027*** -0.025** -0.034*** 
4 REM / FI-Tariff -0.023** -0.021** -0.028*** 
5 REM / WBDI-Openness -0.024** -0.022** -0.031*** 
 Significant Increase in the Magnitude of 
Remittances 2/5 2/5 2/5 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent variable is 
the Gini Coefficient.  All independent variables are in logs. The t-statistics are suppressed for clarity but the asterisks 
correspond to the level of significance.  The last row reflects the number of cases in which the IQI significantly 
increase the marginal effect of remittances when compared to values in row one. 
 
After addressing potential endogeneity bias, the results show that the marginal impact of 
remittances on inequality increases in 17 out of the 25 regressions using Panel OLS, 18/25 using 
IV1 and 19/25 using IV2. Moreover, the PE indicators emerge as the most important IQIs in 
leveraging the equalizing effect of remittances. That is, freedom from corruption, law and order, 
and property right indicators assist remittance inflows in narrowing the income gap in developing 
countries.  
 
4.2 Heavy Recipient Countries 
 
We complement our analysis by focusing on those countries heavily dependent on remittances. 
Specifically, we construct a subset of countries with remittances-to-GDP share of more than 1% 
(the sample size changes from 79 to 46 countries). Table 7 shows the results from Equation (1) 
using this subset of countries and reveals how remittances have a much stronger impact on 
inequality. The remittance parameter notably increases from −0.025 (Table 2) to −0.052 (Table 7) 
when using the panel OLS estimations. Using 2SLS, the remittances change from −0.023 to −0.053 
(IV1) and from −0.032 to –0.065 (IV2). 
 
Table 8 replicates Table 3 using the subset of countries with remittances-to-GDP share of more 
than 1%. The negative relationship between remittances and income inequality is not only stable, 
it is also robust. Once controlling for WGI – Rule of Law, the magnitude of remittances under IV1 
is strengthened from -0.053 (Table 7) to -0.055 (Table 8) using IV1. Overall, after controlling for 
the quality of institutions, remittances become a stronger tool for reducing income inequality 
among these subsets of countries. This is consistent with the findings in Koechlin and Leon (2007) 
in which remittances reduce inequality when the remittances-to-GDP ratio is greater than 
approximately 1.4 percent. 
 
Remittances reduce income inequality in developing nations. Furthermore, remittances reduce 
income inequality by a greater magnitude in nations with an improved institutional framework. 
Our results, however, have some limitations. The possible endogeneity between each IQI and the 
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Gini coefficient is an ongoing concern. Developing several IVs that effectively substitute for each 
IQI is a notable challenge. 
 
Table 7: Remittances and income inequality among high remittance countries 
Variable Panel OLS 
(1) 
2SLS-IV1 
(2) 
2SLS-IV2 
(3) 
REM -0.052*** 
(-3.54) 
-0.053*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.25) 
GDPpc 0.991*** 
(2.82) 
0.990*** 
(2.82) 
0.988*** 
(2.78) 
GDPpc2 -0.059*** 
(-2.49) 
-0.059** 
(-2.49) 
-0.059** 
(-2.46) 
EDU -0.116* 
(-2.48) 
-0.115* 
(-1.76) 
-0.101 
(-1.19) 
Constant 1.243 
(1.02) 
1.264 
(1.04) 
1.463 
(1.19) 
Wald stat- χ2 
(p-value) 
 31.92 
(0.000) 
36.67 
(0.000) 
Cragg-Donald 
stat-F (p-value) 
 1007.64 
(0.000) 
164.08 
(0.000) 
Hausman stat- 
χ2 (p-value) 
 0.60 
(0.963) 
8.50 
(0.075) 
Observations 130 130 130 
R-Squared 0.417 0.407 0.395 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent 
variable is the Gini Coefficient.  All variables are in logs and t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. The Hausman 
test compares the estimators from the OLS model and the 2SLS models where the null hypothesis is that the estimators 
from the 2SLS are efficient and consistent as those from the OLS estimators. The Wald test confirms the IVs are 
exogenous and the Cragg-Donald statistic tests the strength of the IVs. 
 
Table 8: Remittances and income inequality among high remittance countries 
Variable Panel 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
IV1 
(2) 
2SLS 
IV2 
(3) 
Panel 
OLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
IV1 
(5) 
2SLS 
IV2 
(6) 
Panel 
OLS 
(7) 
2SLS 
IV1 
(8) 
2SLS 
IV2 
(9) 
REM -0.054*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.067*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.052*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.072*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.056*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.067*** 
(-4.48) 
GDPpc 0.662* 
(1.73) 
0.661* 
(1.73) 
0.643* 
(1.67) 
0.799** 
(2.08) 
0.795** 
(2.07) 
0.747* 
(1.92) 
0.891*** 
(2.65) 
0.891*** 
(2.65) 
0.874*** 
(2.57) 
GDPpc2 -0.037 
(-1.44) 
-0.037 
(-1.44) 
-0.036 
(-1.38) 
-0.047* 
(-1.82) 
-0.047* 
(1.84) 
-0.043* 
(-1.65) 
-0.053** 
(-2.36) 
-0.053** 
(-2.36) 
-0.052** 
(-2.29) 
EDU -0.065 
(-0.94) 
-0.064 
(-0.92) 
-0.047 
(-0.67) 
-0.084 
(-1.21) 
-0.082 
(-1.19) 
-0.062 
(-0.88) 
-0.093 
(-1.35) 
-0.093 
(-1.53) 
-0.080 
(-1.30) 
WGI-Rule 
of Law 
-0.072 
(-1.38) 
-0.072 
(-1.39) 
-0.075 
(-1.43) 
      
WGI-Abs 
Violence 
   0.002 
(0.06) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.019 
(-0.48) 
   
FI-Black 
Market 
      0.029** 
(2.33) 
0.029** 
(2.33) 
0.028** 
(2.24) 
Constant 2.288* 
(1.73) 
2.307* 
(1.75) 
2.554* 
(1.91) 
1.899 
(1.39) 
1.938 
(1.42) 
2.374* 
(1.71) 
1.390 
(1.16) 
1.390 
(1.16) 
1.651 
(1.36) 
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Wald χ2 
(p) 
 27.76 
(0.000) 
32.49 
(0.000) 
 24.86 
(0.000) 
29.87 
(0.000) 
 39.90 
(0.000) 
44.81 
(0.000) 
Cragg-
Donald (p) 
 849.56 
(0.000) 
134.87 
(0.000) 
 845.83 
(0.000) 
121.40 
(0.000) 
 895.43 
(0.000) 
122.53 
(0.000) 
Hausman  
χ2 (p) 
 0.33 
(0.997) 
8.01 
(0.156) 
 0.55 
(0.990) 
8.88 
(0.114) 
 0.00 
(0.999) 
7.42 
(0.191) 
Obs. 112 110 112 112 112 112 119 119 119 
R2 0.439 0.561 0.425 0.368 0.368 0.362 0.513 0.511 0.437 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The dependent 
variable is the Gini Coefficient.  All variables are in logs and t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. The Hausman 
test compares the estimators from the OLS model and the 2SLS models where the null hypothesis is that the estimators 
from the 2SLS are efficient and consistent as those from the OLS estimators. The Wald test confirms the IVs are 
exogenous and the Cragg-Donald statistic tests the strength of the IVs. The (p) means p value. 
 
This study provides evidence of the complementarity between remittances and quality of 
institutions in reducing income inequality for a large group of developing nations. However, there 
are several dimensions on the relationship between remittances and inequality, remittances and 
institutions, and institutions and inequality that have been left for further examination. For instance, 
the non-linear relationship between remittances and inequality, and institutions and inequality 
observed in studies with micro-data is a promising area of research. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between remittances and inequality 
when controlling for the quality of institutions. By compiling 25 variables on institutional 
attributes and data on remittances and income inequality for 79 developing nations, we found that 
these unilateral foreign inflows reduce the gap between rich and poor. This effect is reinforced 
further by the quality of the institutional context. When incorporating the 12 PE indicators into the 
analysis, we found that remittances reduce income inequality in nearly all cases (under IV1 and 
IV2 regressions). In the case of PS indexes, the remittance coefficient is significantly higher in the 
majority of cases (under IV1 and IV2 regressions), and when controlling for the EP indexes, the 
remittance coefficient is significantly higher in 40% of cases (under IV1 and IV2 regressions). 
These values are sustained among heavy-remittance recipient nations. 
 
Our results indicate a robust negative relationship between remittances and inequality once the 
institutional infrastructure is accounted for. However, empirical results on the relationship between 
remittances and income inequality can be tainted by endogeneity bias stemming from the possible 
effects of inequality on remittances. In order to minimize this concern, we developed two 
instrumental variables and performed numerous regression analyses to corroborate the stability of 
the parameter values. First, we developed a panel OLS system, followed by a 2SLS regression 
analysis. By using IVs that are highly correlated with remittances but to some extent unrelated to 
the Gini coefficient, we addressed the endogeneity issues commonly observed in this type of 
empirical analysis. 
 
Several policy implications can be drawn from our findings. Developing countries currently coping 
with high levels of corruption might lead to a deterioration of income for the poor, even more so 
than that among higher-income citizens. Facing poor quality of institutions, remittance recipients 
in the lowest-income cohorts may opt out using remittances toward long-term effective economic 
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activities, such as education, health, and developing or expanding new businesses. Thus, any 
possible income equalizing effects through the marginal productivity of remittances may be absent. 
Policymakers interested in enhancing the benefits of remittances among the poor can tackle 
institutional shortcomings by facilitating the procedures to open a new business, by promoting 
transparency regarding property rights documentation, and by reinforcing the law enforcement. In 
addition, remittances should be welcomed into recipient countries through minimal and clear 
banking and exchange rate systems. 
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Appendix 1. Institutional Quality Indicators (IQI): Variables and Sources 
Variable Description (Source and Number of Observations) 
Gini Coefficient The Gini Coefficient is the measure of income inequality from The World 
Bank.  This measure ranges from 0 (lowest inequality) to 1 (highest 
inequality). Years: 1990 to 2010. 
REM Remittances. It is the sum of three items: workers’ remittances, compensation 
of employees, and migrant transfers. (WBD). Years: 1990 to 2010. 
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita is from The World Bank 
Education Secondary enrolment rates provide by The World Bank 
ICRG-Corruption Range: Min=0 (high corruption); Max=6 (low corruption). (ICRG) 
ICRG-Law and Order Range: Min=0 (the law is ignored or without effective sanction); Max=6 
(strong judicial system).  (ICRG) 
ICRG-Bureaucracy 
Quality 
Range: Min=0 (a change in government tends to be difficult); Max=4 (the 
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy.) (ICRG) 
ICRG-Quality 
Institutions 
Range Min=0; Max =16. It is the sum of corruption, law and order, and 
bureaucracy quality as in Bekaert et al. (2006). (ICRG) 
WGI-Regulatory 
Quality 
Range: Min=-2.0 (weak perception of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies); Max = 2.5 (a very positive 
perception of a government with the ability to formulate and implement sound 
policies). (WGI) 
WGI-Rule of Law Range: Min =-2.0 (weak perception of contract enforcement, property rights, 
police, and courts); Max = 2.5 (strong perception of citizens abiding by the 
rule of law). (WGI) 
WGI-Corruption Range: Min=-2.5 (a perception of power of interest groups, usage of public 
institutions for private gains, etc.); Max = 2.5 (a perception of almost no 
evidence of public power exercised for private gain, including, petty and grand 
forms of corruption). (WGI)  
HF-Economic 
Freedom Index 
Score: Min=0, Max=100. It scores nations on 10 factors of economic freedom 
using statistics from the World Bank, the IMF and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit. The 10 components are equally weighted and averaged. (HF) 
HF-Property Rights It assesses the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by 
laws that are enforced by the state. (HF) 
HF-Freedom from 
Corruption 
Score: Min=0 (private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to the 
state. People do not have access to the courts); Max=100 (private property is 
guaranteed. The court system enforces contracts efficiently. The justice system 
punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. (HF) 
FI-Legal/ Property 
Rights 
Range: Min=0 (low perception of judicial independence, impartial court 
protection, and no integrity in the legal and judicial system), Max=10 (high-
clear-neutral legal and judicial processes). (FI) 
TI-Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
Range: Min=0 (high corruption); Max=10 (low or no corruption). (TI) 
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ICRG-Government 
Stability 
Range: Min =0 (government’s inability to carry out its declared programs and 
its ability to stay in office); Max=12 (government’s ability to carry out its 
declared programs and its ability to stay in office). (ICRG) 
ICRG-Internal 
Conflict 
Range: Min=0 (political violence in the country); Max= 12 (no political 
violence in the country). (ICRG) 
ICRG-External 
Conflict 
Range: Min=0 (high degree of diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade 
restrictions, sanctions, cross-border conflicts, etc.); Max= 12 (nonexistence of 
diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, sanctions, cross-
border conflicts, etc.) (ICRG) 
ICRG-Ethnic 
Tensions 
Range: Min=0 (high degree of racial, language or nationality tensions); Max = 
6 (low degree of racial, language or nationality tensions). (ICRG) 
Polity IV Range: Min=-10 (autocratic government), Max=10 (democratic government). 
(INSCR) 
WGI-Voice and 
Accountability 
Range: Min=-2.5 (weak governance performance such as citizens ability to 
participate in public elections, freedom of expression and media); Max=2.5 
(strong governance performance). (WGI) 
WGI-Absence of 
Violence 
Min=-2.5 (high likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by violent means); Max=2.5 (low likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by violent means). (WGI) 
WGI-Government 
Effectiveness 
Range: Min = -2.5 (low perception of the quality of public services and the 
degree of its independence from political pressure); Max=2.5 (high confidence 
in the quality of public services and the degree of its independence from 
political pressure). (WGI) 
Government 
Consumption 
General government final consumption expenditure (as a proportion of GDP) 
(WBDI) 
Money Growth (M2) Money and quasi money growth (annual percentage) (WBDI) 
Openness Trade openness: export plus imports as a share of GDP, in current US$. 
(WBDI) 
Black Market 
Exchange Rate 
It is the difference between the official and the parallel (black) market 
exchange rate. (FI) 
FI-Tariff It is the average tariff rates. (FI) 
Notes: WBDI: World Bank Development Indicator. Years: 1990-2010; ICRG: International Country Risk Guide 
(The Political Risk Service Group). Years: 1984-2009; WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators. Years: 1996-2010; 
HF: The Heritage Foundation. Years: 1995-2009; FI: Fraser Institute Years: 1975-2009; TI-CPI: Transparency 
International, Corruption Perception Index. Years: 1995-2009; INSCR: Integrated Network for Societal Conflict 
Research, Polity IV. Years: 1990-2010. 
 
Appendix 2: List of 79 Developing Countries 
1. Albania 21. El Salvador 41. Malawi 61. Russia 
2. Argentina 22. Estonia 42. Malaysia 62. Rwanda 
3. Armenia 23. Fiji 43. Maldives 63. Senegal 
4. Bangladesh 24. Ghana 44. Mali 64. Sierra Leone 
5. Belize 25. Guatemala 45. Mauritania 65. Slovakia 
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6. Bolivia 26. Guyana 46. Mexico 66. Slovenia 
7. Brazil 27. Honduras 47. Mongolia 67. South Africa 
8. Bulgaria 28. Hungary 48. Morocco 68. Sri Lanka 
9. Cambodia 29. India 49. Mozambique 69. Swaziland 
10. Cameroon 30. Indonesia 50. Namibia 70. Tajikistan 
11. Chile 31. Iran 51. Nepal 71. Thailand 
12. China 32. Jamaica 52. Nicaragua 72. Tunisia 
13. Colombia 33. Jordan 53. Niger 73. Uganda 
14. Costa Rica 34. Kazakhstan 54. Pakistan 74. Ukraine 
15. Cote d’Ivore 35. Kenya 55. Panama 75. Uruguay 
16. Croatia 36. Kyrgyzstan 56. Paraguay 76. Venezuela 
17. Czech Republic 37. Laos 57. Peru 77. Vietnam 
18. Dom. Republic 38. Latvia 58. Philippines 78. Yemen 
19. Ecuador 39. Lesotho 59. Poland 79. Zambia 
20. Egypt 40. Lithuania 60. Moldova  
 
